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Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has been grappling with the
constitutionality of state death penalty statutes since its landmark
decision in Furman v. Georgia.' Although the Furman Court did
not rule on whether the death penalty was a per se violation of the
eighth2 and fourteenth 3 amendments to the United States Consti-
tution, it did hold in a brief per curiam opinion that the imposition
of the death penalty in the case at bar was cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of those amendments. 4
In response to Furman, most of the states revised their death
penalty laws in the years following the decision.5 Two basic types
of statutes emerged: the "guided" discretion statute in which the
sentencing authority was given factors to weigh in deciding whether
to impose capital punishment6 and the mandatory statute in which
death was the automatic penalty for certain capital offenses. 7
In a series of five decisions in 1976,8 the Court reexamined the
constitutionality of these newly-drafted death penalty statutes, up-
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states, in relevant part, "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The eighth amendment is enforceable against the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
4. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam).
5. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the revised
death penalty laws.
6. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b), (c) (1982). See also infra notes 79-92,
115-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of these "guided" discretion statutes.
7. See, e.g., N.Y PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27(l)(a)(ii), (iii) (McKinney 1975)
(infra note 138). See also infra notes 61-68, 93-111 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these mandatory statutes.
8. Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts I), 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (opinion of Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) [hereinafter Stevens opinion]; Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) [hereinafter
Stewart opinion]; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens) [hereinafter Stevens opinion]; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
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holding the "guided" discretion statutes of Georgia, Florida, and
Texas9 while striking down the mandatory laws of North Carolina
and Louisiana.'0 It was apparent from these decisions that mandatory
death penalty statutes passed after Furman would be given more
careful scrutiny than those allowing for some consideration of factors
unique to the defendant.,,
The only category of mandatory statute for which the constitu-
tionality issue was left open by the Court in its 1976 decisions and
in subsequent death penalty cases was that of a mandatory death
penalty for an "extremely narrow category of homicide" defined
"in terms of the character or record of the offender."'" Whether
murder by a life-term prisoner would fit this category was specifically
left open by the Court in its decisions between 1976 and 1978,11 and
was precisely the issue faced by the New York State Court of Ap-
peals in People v. Smith."
Before examining the decision of the New York State Court of
Appeals in Smith, this Note analyzes the relevant Supreme Court
death penalty decisions since 197211 in order to compare New York's
mandatory death statute for life-term prisoners who murder with
other state death penalty statutes that have been reviewed by the
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) [hereinafter Powell opinion]; Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) [hereinafter
Stewart opinion]; see infra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
9. Jurek, 428 U.S. 262 (Stevens opinion); Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242 (Powell
opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (Stewart opinion). See also infra notes 79-92 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the three "guided" discretion statutes.
10. Roberts 1, 428 U.S. 280 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 (Stewart
opinion). See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
two mandatory statutes.
11. See infra notes 79-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scrutiny
given to both the discretionary and mandatory death penalty statutes in these five
decisions.
12. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287 n.7 (Stewart opinion).
13. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.l (1978) (Parts I and II of Chief
Justice Burger's opinion constituted opinion of Court; Part III, which dealt with
constitutionality of death penalty statute, was plurality opinion and will be so
cited); Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts II), 431 U.S. 633, 637 n.5 (1977) (per curiam);
Roberts I, 428 U.S. at 334 n.9 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287 n.7,
292 n.25 (Stewart opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (Stewart opinion); see infra
note 159 and accompanying text. This open question will be hereinafter referred
to as the Supreme Court's lifer reservation.
14. People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1226 (1985); see infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XIII
MANDA TOR Y DEATH PENAL TY
Supreme Court. 16 Since 1976, the Supreme Court has attempted to
provide guidelines for a constitutionally valid death penalty statute,
emphasizing the need for a consideration of mitigating and aggra-
vating factors relevant to the individual offender and offense. 7 The
New York State Court of Appeals struck down New York's man-
datory death penalty statute for life-term inmates based on these
guidelines."8 However, both proponents 9 and opponents 20 of the death
penalty have proffered a variety of moral, penological, and socio-
logical arguments which explore issues beyond the constitutionality
of these statutes. These issues were not considered in depth by the
New York State Court of Appeals, which focused on decisions of
the United States Supreme Court 2I and other federal and state courts22
in its analysis of the mandatory death statute.
After considering both the legal and nonlegal arguments, this Note
concludes that there can not and should not be a mandatory death
penalty for life-term prisoners who murder in New York. 23 This type
of statute is clearly unconstitutional because it does not allow for
individualized consideration of the offender and the offense. 24 In
addition, it is unreasonably discriminatory towards this class of
defendants. 5 A discretionary death penalty statute, which provides
for consideration of both mitigating and aggravating factors, is a
more viable method of imposing a death sentence on a convicted
felon.26 Continuation of the imposition of the sanction of death on
this small category of proven criminals is justifiable as long as it
is not a mandatory punishment for all life-term prisoners but rather
takes into account the uniqueness of the accused felon and the crime
committed. 27 Accordingly, this Note recommends that the New York
legislature draft a discretionary death penalty statute for life-term
prisoners who murder. 21
16. See infra notes 79-122, 179-213 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 214-39 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 214, 240-60 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 160-02, 177-93 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 194-208 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 290-302 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See infra notes 263-72, 287-89 & 290-302 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 273-302 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 287-89, 295-302 and accompanying text.
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II. Constitutional Requirements for Death Sentencing
A. History of the Death Penalty in America
Both mandatory and discretionary death penalty statutes have been
used in the United States since the eighteenth century.2 9 At the time
of the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791, all thirteen states
followed the common law practice of mandating the death penalty
for certain offenses such as murder, treason and arson.30 Juries could
circumvent this extreme sanction only by acquitting the defendant or
finding him guilty of a lesser offense. 3' However, because the death
penalty was mandatory, juries often acquitted a guilty defendant rather
than sentence him to death.32
In response to this threat of "jury nullification," the states began
to abandon these mandatory statutes in favor of statutes which gave
some sentencing discretion to the court in capital cases. By the 1960's,
the only enforceable mandatory death penalty statute3 dealt with
murder or assault with a deadly weapon by a life-term prisoner.3 '
The remainder of the states either had adopted discretionary statutes
which permitted the jury to respond to mitigating factors by
withholding the death penalty 3 or had abolished it completely.36
The new discretionary statutes gave juries complete freedom to
determine whether the death penalty would be imposed in capital
cases.37 Although there were challenges to the constitutionality of
29. See generally THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3-28 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Bedau] (discussion of background and early development of death
penalty in America); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289-93 (Stewart opinion) (discussion of
history of mandatory death penalty statutes in United States).
30. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289 (Stewart opinion).
31. Bedau, supra note 29, at 9.
32. Id. at 9-10.
33. Prior to 1972, there were still a few obscure mandatory death statutes in
the United States which were not enforced. Examples include trainwrecking resulting
in death, perjury in a capital case which resulted in the death of an innocent
person, and treason against a state government. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292 n.25
(Stewart opinion).
34. Id.
35. See Bedau, supra note 29, at 10 for a discussion of the historical development
of these discretionary statutes between 1809 and 1963.
36. See id. at 21-24 for a discussion of the abolition movement in the states
between 1830 and 1970.
37. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969) ("murder in the first degree ... shall
be punished with death: Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court,
[Vol. XIII
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these statutes, none were successful.3" Moreover, as recently as 1971,19
the Supreme Court rejected the argument that allowing jury discretion
in imposing the death penalty violated the standards of fundamental
fairness embodied in the fourteenth amendment due process provision °
and asserted that "[t]he States [were] entitled to assume that jurors
confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death
for a fellow human [would] act with due regard for the consequences
of their decision .... ,,41
B. Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, the constitutional status of discretionary sentencing in
capital cases was placed in question by the Supreme Court's opinion
in Furman v. Georgia.42 In Furman, the Supreme Court heard appeals
from three defendants, all of whom had been convicted in state
court and sentenced to death by juries empowered with complete discre-
tion to determine whether it was the appropriate sanction for the crimes
committed. 43 The three defendants challenged the constitutionality
of the sentencing statute and appealed to the Supreme Court. In a
brief per curiam opinion4 4 accompanied by five concurring 5 and
four dissenting46 opinions, the Court held that the "imposition and
the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the
State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury ... ").
38. See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 587 (1959); Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S.
51, 55 (1937).
39. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
40. Id. at 207-08.
41. Id.
42. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
43. William Henry Furman was convicted of murder, and his death sentence
was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court. Furman v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 253, 167
S.E.2d 628 (1969). Lucious Jackson, Jr. was convicted of rape, and his death
sentence was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court. Jackson v. Georgia, 225 Ga.
790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Elmer Branch was convicted of rape, and his death
sentence was upheld by the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals. Branch v. Texas,
447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
44. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
45. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall concurred in the
decision. See infra notes 49, 51-52 and accompanying text for portions of these
concurring opinions.
46. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented.
See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text for portions of these dissenting opinions.
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carrying out of the death penalty in [the cases at bar] constitute[d]
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments." 4 7
Although the Court did not hold that the imposition of the death
penalty was a per se violation of the Constitution, 4 it did recognize
that death was a unique penalty that could not be assessed under
sentencing procedures which created a substantial risk of arbitrary
and capricious application. 49 However, because each member of the
majority wrote a separate opinion, the precise scope of the Court's
holding was unclear.50 Two Justices, concluding that the eighth
amendment prohibited the death penalty altogether, voted to reverse
the judgments of the state courts" while the other three concurring
Justices, who were unwilling to hold the death penalty per se un-
constitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments, voted
47. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam).
48. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White limited their opinion to the cases at
bar. See id. at 240, 257 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring). Only Justices Brennan and Marshall found
the death penalty to be a per se violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
See id. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("a system of law and
of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the deter-
mination whether defendants . . . should die or be imprisoned [should be con-
demned]" ); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I simply conclude that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed."); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring) ("past and present legislative
judgment with respect to the death penalty loses much of its force when viewed
in light of the recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the jury and
the fact that a jury, in its own discretion and without violating its trust or any
statutory policy, may refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the
circumstances of the crime").
50. Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD NOTE]; see also
Furman, 408 U.S. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Itihe widely divergent views
of the [eighth] Amendment expressed in today's opinions reveal the haze that
surrounds this constitutional command").
51. 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[tioday death is a uniquely
and unusually severe punishment. When examined by the principles applicable under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, death stands condemned as fatally
offensive to human dignity. The punishment of death is therefore 'cruel and unusual,'
and the States may no longer inflict it as punishment for crimes."); id. at 315
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("The question then is not whether we condone rape or
murder, for surely we do not; it is whether capital punishment is 'a punishment
no longer consistent with our own self-respect' and, therefore, violative of the
Eighth Amendment.").
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to invalidate the statutes on other grounds.12 Adding to the ambiguity
of the decision was the fact that the four dissenting Justices offered
differing reasons for upholding the state statutes. 3
C. The States Respond to the Furman Decision
As Chief Justice Burger predicted in his dissenting opinion, the
Furman decision created confusion concerning the form a consti-
tutionally acceptable death penalty statute should take.54 Because the
decision invalidated "unguided" discretionary statutes for thirty-nine
52. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[tihese discretionary statutes are
unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection
of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."); id.
at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring) ("I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems
that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.");
id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the
statutes before us are now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed
that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal
justice.").
53. See id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist, JJ.) ("[tihe legislatures are free to eliminate capital punishment for specific
crimes or to carve out limited exceptions to a general abolition of the' penalty, without
adherence to the conceptual strictures of the Eighth Amendment"); id. at 404 ("[an
Eighth Amendment ruling by judges cannot be made with such flexibility or discrim-
inating precision"); id. at 405 ("[t]he highest judicial duty is to recognize the limits
on judicial power and to permit the democratic processes to deal with matters falling
outside of those limits"); id. at 414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[ajlthough personally
I may rejoice at the Court's result, I find it difficult to accept or justify as a matter
of history, of law, or of constitutional pronouncement. I fear the Court has over-
stepped. It has sought and has achieved an end."); id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ.) (affirmative references to
capital punishment in Constitution, prevailing Supreme Court precedents, limita-
tions on Court's power imposed by doctrine of judicial restraint, and principles of
federalism dictate against reversing death sentences in these three cases); id. at 467
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, and Powell, JJ.) ("[the
most expansive reading of the leading constitutional cases does not remotely suggest
that this Court has . . . [the power] to strike down laws that are based upon notions
of policy or morality suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of this Court").
54. The Chief Justice observed that the actual scope of the Court's ruling "is
not entirely clear," id. at 397 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and that "the future of
capital punishment in this country has been left in an uncertain limbo." Id. at
403. Six years later, looking back at the Furman decision, he remarked that
"Predictably, the variety of opinions supporting the judgment in Furman engendered
confusion as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord
with the Eighth Amendment." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978) (plurality
opinion).
1985]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
states," legislatures that wanted to maintain death as a sanction for
certain crimes had to revise their death penalty statutes. 6 To com-
port with Furman's holding that statutory schemes allowing for ar-
bitrary and capricious death sentencing were unconstitutional,57 state
legislators had two options. First, they could make the death penalty
mandatory so that upon conviction there would be no question regard-
ing the imposition of the sentence. The second alternative was to pro-
vide guidelines for the court to use in determining whether the sanc-
tion of death should be imposed. 8
In the four years following Furman, thirty-five states59 enacted
statutes. Seventeen states passed "guided" discretion statutes, 60 six-
teen passed mandatory death statutes for various forms of criminal
homicide6' while two simply nullified the jury-discretion feature of
their death statutes making capital punishment mandatory. 61 By 1973,
eight 63 of the eighteen states with mandatory death statutes had
included homicide committed by either an inmate serving a life
55. See HARVARD NOTE, supra note 50, at 1690.
56. See generally id. at 1699-1719 for a discussion of the new death penalty
statutes passed in response to Furman.
57. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
58. Bedau, supra note 29, at 250.
59. See, e.g., the first five statutes which were reviewed by the Supreme Court
after Furman: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04, 921.141 (West 1976) ("guided" discretion
statute); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(c) (1982) ("guided" discretion statute); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974) (mandatory death statute); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14-17 (1975) (mandatory death statute); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02, 19.03
(Vernon 1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981) ("guided"
discretion statute). The remaining statutes are cited in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 179 n.23 (1976) (Stewart opinion). See also infra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the mandatory statutes.
60. The states with "guided" discretion statutes were Alabama, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Washington. See Gregg,
428 U.S. at 179 n.23 (Stewart opinion).
61. See Bedau, supra note 29, at 12. Within two years of Furman, California,
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, New Mexico, New
York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Wyoming passed mandatory statutes. Id.
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia followed. Id.
62. Id. The states were Delaware and North Carolina.
63. These eight states were Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New
York, Oklahoma and Wyoming. See Wolfson, The Deterrent Effect of the Death
Penalty Upon Prison Murder in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA at 159 (H. Bedau




sentence64 or an inmate convicted of a capital offense65 in the category
of crimes requiring the sanction of mandatory death. The rationale
behind this classification was twofold: (1) the death penalty satisfied
the public's need for vengeance, and it fit the punishment to the
crime; and (2) the mandatory death penalty provided the deterrence
needed to protect prison staff and inmates from threatened harm.6
The reenactment of mandatory death statutes for these and other
categories of crimes reversed the historic trend away from this type
of statute which had begun in the nineteenth century. 67 At the same
time, the removal of all discretion in sentencing as a response to
Furman's ban on arbitrary and capricious death sentencing reintro-
duced the potential problem of "jury nullification" which had con-
cerned legislators in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 68
D. The Formulation of Guidelines for a Constitutional Death
Penalty Statute
In 1976, after four years of silence on the death penalty, the
Supreme Court began to clarify the Furman prohibition against
arbitrary and capricious death sentencing. In that year, the Court
reviewed "guided" discretion statutes in Georgia, 69 Florida70 and
64. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-13-4-1(b)(6)(iv) (Burns 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:30(3) (West 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2)(b) (1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.030(1)(b) (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1975);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.1 (West Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. § 6-54 (b), (v), (x)
(Supp. 1973). Two additional states passed mandatory death statutes for murder
by any prisoner. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (1981); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-
10(a), 18.2-31(c), 53-291(1) (1975). However, with the exception of New York, all
of these mandatory statutes have been either repealed or amended by the state
legislatures or judicially invalidated, and are now discretionary. New York presently
has no death penalty due to the recent decision in Smith. The legislature may pass
a new discretionary or mandatory statute in the future. See infra notes 155-74, 209-11
and accompanying text.
65. See IDAHlO CODE §§ 18-4003(1), 18-4004 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-13-
4-1(b)(6)(iii) (Burns 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(3) (West 1974); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-54(b)(iv) (1973).
66. See Deterrent Effect of Death Penalty Upon Prison Murder, supra note
63, at 159-60, where this rationale is discussed and challenged.
67. Bedau, supra note 29, at 12.
68. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(c) (1982).
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04.1, 921.141 (West 1976).
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Texas" and mandatory laws in North Carolina 72 and Louisiana 73.
The Court was unable to agree on a unifying rationale in the five
cases.74 Nevertheless, it held that the death penalty was not a per
se violation of the Constitution, 75 and that the concerns it had
expressed in Furman regarding arbitrary sentencing could "be met
by a carefully drafted statute that ensure[d] that the sentencing
authority [was] given adequate information and guidance." '7 6 The
71. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(a), 19.03 (Vernon 1974); TEX. STAT. ANN.
art. 37,071 (Vernon 1981).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969). After the Furman decision, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held unconstitutional the provision of the death penalty
statute that gave the jury the option of returning a guilty verdict without capital
punishment. State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973). However, the
court further held that this provision was severable, and the statute thus survived
as a mandatory death penalty law. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
285-86 (1976) (Stewart opinion).
73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974).
74. There were three groups of Justices in the five cases. Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court in all five. See Roberts v.
Louisiana (Roberts 1), 428 U.S. at 325-36 (1976) (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428
U.S. at 280-305 (Stewart opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 262-77 (Stevens
opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 242-60 (1976) (Powell opinion); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 153-207 (1976) (Stewart opinion).
Justices Brennan and Marshall found the death penalty to be unconstitutional
under all circumstances. They, therefore, joined Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
in striking down the two mandatory death statutes. See Roberts I, 428 U.S. at 336
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Marshall, J., concurring); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 336 (Marshall, J., concurring), and dissented
when the Court upheld the "guided" discretion statutes of Texas, Florida, and Georgia.
See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231-41 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist did not find
any of the statutes unconstitutional for varying reasons. They thus joined Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in upholding the "guided" discretion statutes, see
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 277 (Burger, C.J., concurring), id. at 277-79 (White, J.,
concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260-
61 (White, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 261
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207-26 (White, J., concurring,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 226-27 (Burger, C.J., joined by
Rehnquist, J.); id. at 227 (Blackmun, J. concurring), and dissented when the two
mandatory statutes were struck down. See Roberts I, 428 U.S. at 337 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 337-63 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 363 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Woodson,
428 U.S. at 306-07 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist,
J.); id. at 307-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 308-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. Roberts I, 428 U.S. at 331 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285
(Stewart opinion); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268 (Stevens opinion); Proffitt, 428 U.S. 247
(Powell opinion), Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 (Stewart opinion).
76. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (Stewart opinion).
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Court established guidelines for drafting this statute in the five
decisions,77 and while a clear mandate was not given to the states
regarding the substance of their statutes, 7 it was apparent that the
Court favored the "guided" discretion over the mandatory statutes.
In Gregg v. Georgia79 and its companion cases, 0 seven members
of the Court agreed that the imposition of the death penalty under
the "guided" discretion statutes of Georgia, Flordia and Texas did
not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in
the eighth and fourteenth amendments." Although the states were
granted wide latitude in enacting death penalty laws as a result of
these decisions, it was clear that the Court favored a statute which
provided guidance for both the jury and sentencing authority. 2 Since
the Georgia and Florida statutes required the jury and trial judge
to consider statutory mitigating and aggravating factors before im-
posing a sentence of death, the Court concluded that imposition of
the death penalty was not arbitrary.8 3 The statute upheld in Jurek
v. Texas 4 did not include a list of statutorily prescribed aggravating
circumstances as did those in Georgia and Florida. Nevertheless, the
Court held that because the statute narrowed capital offenses to five
categories of murder and the jury was allowed to consider whatever
evidence of mitigating circumstances the defense offered,85 the death
77. See infra notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
79. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Stewart opinion).
80. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (Stevens opinion); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976) (Powell opinion).
81. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (Stevens opinion); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60
(Powell opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 (Stewart opinion); id. at 207 (White, J.,
concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
82. See SCHWAB, LEGISLATING A DEATH PENALTY 18-20 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as LEGISLATING A DEATH PENALTY].
83. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-253 (Powell opinion); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(5),(6) (West 1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97, 206-07 (Stewart opinion);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b), (c) (1982).
84. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (Stevens opinion).
85. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03 (Vernon 1974); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 37.071
(Vernon Supp. 1981); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268-71, 273. The Texas statute limited
capital homicide to intentional and knowing murders committed in five situations:
murder of a peace officer or fireman; murder committed during a kidnapping,
burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson; murder committed for remuneration;
murder committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution;
and murder committed by a prison inmate when the victim was a prison employee.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03 (Vernon 1974). The Court felt that these were similar
to aggravating circumstances because the jury had to find the defendant guilty of
one of these categories of murder before imposing a sentence of death. Jurek, 428
U.S. at 269-70.
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penalty was being imposed in a rational and consistent manner.86
Two additional components of the three statutes helped ensure
their constitutionality. First, each contained a provision for an au-
tomatic, expedited appeal to the highest court of the state. The
Supreme Court did not mandate an elaborate system of appellate
review8 7 like that found in the Georgia statute whereby each sentence
was examined to determine whether it was proportional to other
sentences imposed for similar crimes.88 The Court did comment
favorably, however, on the appellate procedures of all three states.89
The second feature praised by the Court in Gregg" was the provision
for a bifurcated hearing on the issues of guilt and penalty, whereby
in a separate proceeding, the sentencing authority was apprised of
all information relevant to the imposition of the death penalty and
provided with standards to guide its use of the information. 91
These three recommendations-a consideration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances related to the individual offender and of-
fense; a provision for appellate review of the death sentence in the
state's highest court; and a bifurcated hearing on the issues of guilt
and penalty-were not mandatory requirements for a constitutionally
valid death penalty statute. However, because all three procedures
provided guidelines to assist the sentencing authority in exercising
its judgment regarding the penalty of death, the Court implied that
their presence would help ensure the constitutionality of the statute. 92
For many of the same reasons that the "guided" discretion statutes
of Georgia, Florida and Texas were upheld, the mandatory death
penalty statutes of North Carolina93 and Louisiana94 were struck
86. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270-74, 276 (Stevens opinion).
87. See LEGISLATING A DEATH PENALTY, supra note 82, at 18-19.
88. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (Stewart opinion); see also GA. CODE ANN. §
17-10-30(b), (c) (1982).
89. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269 (Stevens opinion); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 37.071(0 (Vernon 1981); see also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251, 258 (Powell opinion);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West 1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 206 (Stewart
opinion).
90. The Court did not discuss a bifurcated proceeding in either Proffitt or
Jurek.
91. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (Stewart opinion).
92. See id. ("We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures
would be permissable under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along
these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct
system must be examined on an individual basis. Rather, we... [want] to make clear
that it is possible to construct capital-sentencing systems capable of meeting Furman's
constitutional concerns." (footnotes omitted)).
93. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (Stewart opinion).
94. Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts I), 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (Stevens opinion).
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down as violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 95 The
Court distinguished the two statutes both substantively9" and
procedurally97 but found the differences to be of little constitutional
significance.98 The fact that Louisiana had narrowed first-degree murder
to five categories of homicide was found to be an "inadequate response
to the harshness and inflexibility of a mandatory death sentence
statute." 99 In both cases, the Court held that the challenged portions
of the statute were unconstitutional because: (1) they were morally
unacceptable to society ' as they did not reflect "the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark[ed] the progress of a maturing society; 1' 1
(2) they failed to provide standards to guide juries in determining
whether or not to impose the death penalty; 2 (3) there was no ap-
pellate review of death sentences;103 and (4) no provisions were made
for an examination of the individual character and record of a defen-
95. Roberts 1, 428 U.S. at 336 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305
(Stewart opinion).
96. See Roberts 1, 428 U.S. at 331-32 (Stevens opinion). The crime of first
degree murder covered by the statute in Woodson included any willful, deliberate,
premeditated homicide and felony murder, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1975),
while Louisiana limited first degree murder to five categories of homicide: killing
in connection with the commission of certain felonies, killing of a fireman or a
peace officer in the performance of his duties, killing by a person with a prior
murder conviction or under a current life sentence, killing with intent to inflict
harm on more than one person, and killing for remuneration. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974). Only the first part of the statute was challenged in the
case at bar. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(1) ("First degree murder is the
killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or
to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in ... aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
rape or armed robbery."). Section 14:30(2), which related to the killing of a fireman
or peace officer, was challenged the following year in Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts
II), 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam). See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying
text.
97. See Roberts I, 428 U.S. at 332 (Stevens opinion). In Louisiana, the jury
in every first degree murder case had to be instructed on the crimes of first and
second degree murder and manslaughter and be provided with the verdicts of guilty
of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, and
not guilty. In contrast, instructions on lesser included offenses in North Carolina
had to be based solely on evidence adduced at trial. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289-96 (Stewart opinion).
100. Roberts 1, 428 U.S. at 332 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301
(Stewart opinion).
101. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301 (Stewart opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
102. Roberts 1, 428 U.S. at 334-35 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
302-03 (Stewart opinion).
103. Roberts I, 428 U.S. at 335-36 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
303 (Stewart opinion).
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dant by considering statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.""4 Because both mandatory statutes "treat[ed] all per-
sons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but.as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death,""'
the portions of the statutes challenged in the cases at bar were declared
to be unconstitutional. 0 6
The following year, the Court continued its attack on Louisiana's
mandatory death statute0 7 by striking down the section of the law
which made the death penalty mandatory for the intentional killing
of a fireman or peace officer engaged in the lawful performance
of his duties. °8 The Court, basing its decision on the statute's failure
to allow for consideration of particularized mitigating factors, 0 9
recognized that the murder victim's status as a peace officer per-
forming his lawful duties was a powerful aggravating circumstance. 10
However, it concluded that it was incorrect to presume that no
mitigating factors could exist when the victim was a fireman or
peace officer."' In Roberts v. Louisiana, the Court reaffirmed its
commitment to the individualized consideration of the offender and
offense and implied once again that a mandatory death statute
without provision for mitigating and aggravating circumstances would
not meet its test of constitutionality.112
104. Roberts 1, 428 U.S. at 333-34 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at
303-04 (Stewart opinion).
105. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (Stewart opinion).
106. Roberts I, 428 U.S. at 336 (Stevens opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305
(Stewart opinion).
107. Roberts v. Louisiana (Roberts II), 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam).
108. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(2) (West 1974) ("First degree murder is the
killing of a human being: (2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or
to inflict great bodily harm upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged
in the performance of his lawful duties.").
109. Roberts 11, 431 U.S. at 637-38 (per curiam). Just as in Roberts I, Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens were joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall in
striking down the mandatory death statute as violative of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 633-38 (per curiam). Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices
White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist in dissenting opinions which would have upheld
the statute. Id. at 638. (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 638-42 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting, joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 642-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing, joined by White, J.).
110. Id. at 636 (per curiam).
111. Id. at 636-37 (per curiam). The Court suggested that the youth of the
offender, the absence of any prior conviction, the influence of drugs, alcohol, or
extreme emotional disturbance, and moral justification might be considered as
mitigating factors in the case at bar. Id. at 637.
112. Id. at 636-38.
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In 1978 ' 1' and again in 1982,'" the imposition of sentences under
certain "guided" discretion statutes also was found to be uncon-
stitutional. An Ohio statute that limited the range of mitigating
circumstances which the sentencing authority could consider"5 was
declared unconstitutional"' because the "Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require[d] that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind
of capital case,[7'] not be precluded from considering as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffer[ed]
as a basis for a sentence less than death.""' 8 Applying this principle
to Oklahoma's discretionary death statute, the Court again vacated
a death sentence because the sentencer refused to consider all of the
mitigating evidence presented by the defense.' The Oklahoma statute
had provided for a bifurcated proceeding which included a penalty
113. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
114. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
115. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1975) listed only the following
three mitigating factors which must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence: (1) the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it; (2) it is unlikely
that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the offender
was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation; and (3) the offense was primarily
the product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition
was insufficient to establish the defense of insanity. Id.
116. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
in finding the Ohio statute unconstitutional. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 597-609 (plurality
opinion). Justices Blackmun and White found the death sentence invalid due to
the actual role the defendant played in the murder. Id. at 612-13 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshall found the death penalty to be unconstitutional under all circumstances.
Id. at 619-21 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist wanted
to uphold the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 628-36 (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan did not participate in the decision.
117. The Justices indicated that a life-term prisoner found guilty of murder might
fit this category of "rare capital cases." Id. at 604 n. 11 (plurality opinion). However,
they declined to express an opinion as to whether or not special deterrence was
needed for this type of criminal. Id.
118. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion) (italics in original). The Justices suggested
that factors such as the defendant's character, prior record, age, lack of specific
intent to cause death, and minor role played in the actual murder committed were
mitigating factors that should have been considered by the sentencing authority.
Id. at 608 (plurality opinion).
119. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 105 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell was joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor. Id. at 104-17. However, Justice
Brennan wrote a separate opinion where he again stated his view that the death
penalty was unconstitutional under all circumstances. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). In addition, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in order to
emphasize the variety of mitigating information that a trial court might consider.
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hearing where the defense could present all mitigating and aggravating
evidence. 2 ' However, because the trial judge only considered one
mitigating factor, the defendant's age, before imposing the penalty
of death,' 2' the Court concluded that "U]ust as the State may not
by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating fac-
tor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence."' 2 2
Since 1982, no capital punishment decision of the Supreme Court
has had the far reaching effects on state penal laws as the cases
decided in the 1970's.123 Although a number of procedural issues
Id. at 117-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist dissented, expressing the view that because the Oklahoma
statute was constitutional under the eighth amendment, the Supreme Court was
not authorized to determine whether the state court imposed an "appropriate"
sentence. Id. at 120-28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist, JJ.).
120. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.10, 701.12 (West 1983). Section 701.10
provides that after a defendant is found guilty of first degree murder, a separate
sentencing proceeding be held to determine whether the defendant should be sen-
tenced to death. It further states that all mitigating and aggravating evidence may
be presented at this hearing. Section 701.12 lists eight aggravating circumstances:
being convicted of a prior felony involving the use of violence; knowingly creating
a risk of death to more than one person; committing murder for remuneration or
employing one to do this; committing an especially heinous crime; murdering to
avoid lawful arrest or prosecution; murdering while serving a sentence for a felony;
posing a continuing threat to society due to the possibility that defendant would
commit further acts of violence; murdering a peace officer or correctional guard
in the performance of his official duties. Id. § 701.12. The statute is silent on
what is meant by mitigating evidence. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 106.
121. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 106-10. The defendant was sixteen years old.
However, the trial judge found that his age did not outweigh the three aggravating
circumstances presented by the prosecutor which were enumerated in the Oklahoma
statute: that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the crime
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
prosecution, and that there was a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Id.
at 106-08; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(4)(5)(7) (West 1983).
The trial judge refused to consider the defendant's turbulent family history,
including beatings by his father and severe emotional disturbance, which was
presented by the defense counsel as mitigating evidence. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at
112-16.
122. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14 (plurality opinion) (italics in original).
123. However, the effects of the most recent Supreme Court ruling in Wainwright
v. Witt, 53 U.S.L.W. 4108 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1985), are yet to be felt. In Wainwright,
the Court held that a trial judge may remove a potential juror who opposes capital
punishment if he expresses views that would "prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions or oath."
Id. at 4111. Prior to this ruling, a juror could only be removed if it was unmistakably
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have been clarified since Furman,2 " new guidelines for a constitu-
tional state death penalty statute have not been proposed.
III. The Post-Furman Death Penalty in New York
In 1963, New York State became the last state in the nation to
repeal a statute requiring mandatory execution for an intentional
murder. On September 1, 1967, a revised Penal Code took effect which
provided for a discretionary death penalty in three situations: where
the victim was a peace officer, where the victim was a peace officer,
where the victim was an employee of a state or local corrections facil-
ity, or where the defendant was already serving a term of imprison-
ment for life.' 25 Following a conviction for murder in one of these
clear that he or she would automatically vote against imposition of the death
penalty. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); see also Greenhouse,
Justices, in Death Penalty Ruling, Back the Exclusion of Some Jurors, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 22, 1985, at A14, col. 1 ("The 7-to-2 decision was one of the most significant
decisions on the death penalty in recent terms."); Greenhouse, Another Push for
Capital Punishment, N.Y Times, Jan. 27, 1985, at 22E, col. 1 ("The new decision
takes the Court a long step toward repudiating the premise of many earlier rulings,
that because 'death is different,' special care must be taken at every stage in the
process").
124. See 1983 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1983]. For example, in Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984), the
Court held that a proportionality review by a court with statewide jurisdiction of
similar punishments meted out for similar crimes in the state was not required by
the eighth amendment. For a recent study of proportionality review, see generally
Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661-753 (1983).
In California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), the Court held that a required
instruction to the jury that a life sentence without parole could be commuted by
the Governor was not unconstitutional but "merely an accurate statement of a
potential sentencing alternative." Id. at 1009. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939,
reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 209 (1983), a death sentence imposed as a result of the
trial judge's improper use of the defendant's prior criminal record was upheld by
the Court. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court upheld the
admissibility of psychiatric evidence predicting _future dangerousness and ap-
proved the acceleration of the appeals process in capital cases. For a more thorough,
discussion of these four cases, see Pascucci, Strauss & Watchman, Capital Punishment
in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
1174-87, 1198-1201, 1205-14 (1983-84) [hereinafter cited as ABANDONING THE PURSUIT
OF FAIRNESS AND CONSISTENCY]. The article criticizes these recent Supreme Court
decisions for increasing the likelihood of unfair and inconsistent sentencing decisions.
Id. at 1214-16.
Issues still pending before the Court include the effectiveness of counsel in capital
cases, the practice by trial judges of overriding a jury's sentence recommendation,
and the admissibility of research findings of racial discrimination in the imposition
of the death penalty. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1983, supra, at 2-3.
125. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30 (McKinney 1967) (repealed 1974).
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three situations, a separate penalty trial was to be conducted.' 26 At
this second stage of the bifurcated procedure, either party could pre-
sent evidence about the defendant's background, any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, or the nature of the crime committed.' 2 7
The imposition of the death penalty was left completely to the discre-
tion of the jury, whose decision had to be unanimous.'28
One year after the Supreme Court ruling in Furman,2 9 the con-
stitutionality of this discretionary death penalty statute was challenged
in People v. Fitzpatrick.1 30 The New York State Court of Appeals
unanimously held the statute to be violative of the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because the
imposition of the death penalty was left to the untrammeled discretion
of the jury. 13'
A. The New York Legislature Responds to Furman
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Fitzpatrick,'32 the
New York Assembly Codes Committee began hearings on new death
penalty proposals. 133 Governor Rockefeller strongly supported a man-
datory death penalty for the murder of peace officers and prison
guards.1 4 In addition, a number of lawmakers believed that the
Supreme Court objected to the optional nature of the death penalty
and that a statute mandating capital punishment for certain kinds
of murder would be constitutional. 3 ' A committee of the state
attorneys general organization also subscribed to the view that a
mandatory death penalty for specific offenses was the alternative
126. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.35 (McKinney 1967) (repealed 1974).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
130. 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973).
131. Id. at 512-13, 300 N.E.2d at 145-46, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
132. 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
133. See People v. Velez, 88 Misc. 2d 378, 398, 388 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
134. Id. at 398, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
135. Id.; see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 298-99 (Stewart opinion) ("The fact that
some States have adopted mandatory measures following Furman while others have
legislated standards to guide jury discretion appears attributable to diverse readings
of this Court's multi-opinioned decision in that case.").
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most likely to withstand constitutional attack. 36 In response to the
arguments of these three groups, the New York State Legislature,
at its 1974 session, repealed the judicially invalidated death penalty
statute3 7 and enacted a new mandatory death penalty law.' 38
136. Velez, 88 Misc. 2d at 398, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
137. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.30, 125.35 (McKinney 1967) (repealed 1974), see
supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
138. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1975) ("When a person is convicted
of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27, the court shall sentence
the defendant to death."); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1975):
Murder in the First Degree A person is guilty of murder in the first
degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes death of
such person; and
(a) Either:
(i) the victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision 34 of section
1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was killed in the course of perform-
ing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the victim was a police officer; or
(ii) the victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or was
an employee of a local correction facility as defined in subdivision two
of section forty of the correction law, who was killed in the course of
performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known that the victim was an employee of a state correctional in-
stitution or a local correction facility; or
(iii) at the time of the commission of the crime, the defendant was con-
fined in a state correctional institution, or was otherwise in custody upon
a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence commuted
to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate term the
minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of which
was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the crime, the defen-
dant had escaped from such confinement or custody and had not yet been
returned to such confinement or custody; and
(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
2. In an prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional distur-
bance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a per-
son in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute
a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter
in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree; or
(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the
use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing
contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for,
or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any
other crime except murder in the second degree.
Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
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B. The New York State Court of Appeals Dismantles the
Mandatory Death Penalty Law
New York's mandatory death penalty law soon was challenged both
in a state trial court'39 and in the New York State Court of Appeals.' 0
Both courts relied on post-Furman Supreme Court guidelines'" to
invalidate the challenged portion of New York's mandatory death
statute.'2
In People v. Davis, the section of New York's mandatory death
statute relating to the intentional killing of a state or local corrections
officer performing his official duties' 3 was held to violate the eighth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution."' The
defendant in Davis had been convicted of the first degree murder
of a New York City Department of Corrections officer and had
been sentenced to death under Penal Law sections 60.06 and 125.27.141
On appeal, the New York State Court of Appeals vacated the trial
court's death sentence and remitted the case for resentencing 46 be-
cause "New York's statute, as presently written, in the absence of
any provision in it for consideration of relevant and particularized
mitigating factors, despite its narrow categories and various statutory
139. People v. Velez, 88 Misc. 2d 378, 388 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1976).
140. People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1978).
141. See supra notes 79-111 and accompanying text.
142. For a discussion of Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d
735, see infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
In Velez, the trial court declared New York's mandatory death sentence for the
crime of first degree murder to be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 88 Misc.
2d at 405, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 537. Because the New York Penal Law did not focus
on the character and background of the convicted defendant or allow the judge
or jury to consider mitigating or aggravating factors, the statute was held to be
unconstitutional. Id. at 402-03, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 535. The trial court compared the
New York statute to the two struck down in Woodson and Roberts I, id. at 401-
03, 405, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 533-5, 537, and determined that Penal Law § 60.06
impermissibly prevented the court or jury from considering relevant sentencing
information. Id. at 405, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 537. In addition, the court noted that
"[d]eveloping standards of decency in a mature and stable society repudiate[d] an
automatic death sentence, however heinous the condemned conduct may be." Id.
at 402, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
143. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(ii), supra note 138.
144. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d at 37, 371 N.E.2d at 466, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
145. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27(l)(a)(ii), supra note 138.
146. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d at 37, 371 N.E.2d at 467, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
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defenses, [was] unconstitutional under recent holdings of the United
States Supreme Court.' ' 47
The court of appeals noted that an individualized consideration
of the character, record, and background of the particular offender
was the most important aspect of the sentencink decision 4s and
found it incorrect to presume that no mitigating circumstances could
exist when the victim was a police or corrections officer. 49 Factors
such as the youth of the offender, the absence of any prior conviction,
the influence of drugs, alcohol, extreme emotional disturbance and
moral justification were all relevant to a sentencing decision involving
the sanction of death."' The fact that the New York statute included
mitigating factors as affirmative defenses"' was insufficient to prevent
it from being declared unconstitutional. Since these defenses did not
allow for a consideration of the character or record of the defendant,
their presence did not convince the court of appeals that the statute
should be upheld.' 2 As a result of this decision, New York's man-
datory death statute for the murder of a police or corrections officer
was invalidated,' 53 leaving murder by a prisoner serving a life-term
as the only crime with a mandatory sanction of death in New York.'5 4
147. Id. at 37, 371 N.E.2d at 466, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 746. Because New York's
mandatory statute was seen to be similar to the Louisiana death statute struck
down in Roberts II, that decision was held to be decisive. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d at
32, 371 N.E.2d at 463, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 743; see supra notes 107-12 and accom-
panying text.
The New York Court of Appeals did not pass on the constitutionality of the
statute under the New York State Constitution. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d at 36 n.4, 371
N.E.2d at 466 n.4, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 746 n.4.
148. Id. at 35, 371 N.E.2d at 466, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
149. Id. at 32, 371 N.E.2d at 464, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
150. Id.
151. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(2)(a), (b), supra note 138.
152. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d at 34, 371 N.E.2d at 464-65, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
153. Id. at 37, 371 N.E.2d at 466, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 746. Note, however, that
this was a 4-3 decision. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Breitel stated his
belief that "the New York statute appear[edi to meet the latest tests for validity
laid down by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 39, 371 N.E.2d at .468,
400 N.Y.S.2d at 747. (Breitel, C.J., dissenting). "Because the New York statute
defining first degree murder is so narrowly drawn, and because the statutory scheme
takes into consideration possible mitigating factors by making them defenses to
the substantive crime, it does not run afoul of constitutional limitations." Id. at
40, 371 N.E.2d at 468, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Judges Jasen and Gabrielli concurred
in the dissent and did not write separate opinions. See id. at 47, 371 N.E.2d at
473, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
154. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(iii), supra note 138; see also Davis, 43
N.Y.2d at 34-35 n.3, 371 N.E.2d at 465 n.3, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 745 n.3 ("The Supreme
Court has reserved the question of whether or in what circumstances mandatory
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C. People v. Smith
In People v. Smith,'" the New York State Court of Appeals was
faced with the precise issue it left open in Davis: whether New York's
mandatory death penalty for murder committed by a life-term
prisoner 16 was constitutional.' 57 However, unlike Davis, in which the
court of appeals relied on the Roberts II decision,' 58 the Smith court
had no Supreme Court guidelines to apply because the Court had
consistently recognized a lifer reservation thereby leaving open the
possibility of a mandatory death statute for this category of
homicide.' 9
death sentence statutes may be constitutionally applied to prisoners serving life
sentences ... Hence, we do not pass on the constitutionality of section 125.27
(subd. 1, par. [a], cl.[iii]) of the Penal Law.").
155. 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1226 (1985).
156. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1975), supra note
138.
157. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 41, 468 N.E.2d at 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 708-09.
Lemuel Smith, a life-term prisoner at Green Haven Correctional Facility in
Stormville, New York was found guilty by the Dutchess County Supreme Court
of the 1981 first degree murder of a state corrections officer and sentenced to
death in accordance with N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06 and 125.27(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney
1975). At the time of the murder, Smith was serving an indeterminate sentence of
twenty-five years to life for two murders and one rape-kidnapping imposed under
N.Y. PENAL LAW §70.30 (McKinney 1975). In addition, he acknowledged respon-
sibility for three additional homicides and one rape although he was never indicted
for them.
158. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text; Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 75,
468 N.E.2d at 896, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
159. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.11 (plurality opinion) ("We express no opinion
as to whether the need to deter certain kinds of homicide would justify a mandatory
death sentence, as, for example, when a prisoner-or escapee-under a life sentence
is found guilty of murder."); Roberts II, 431 U.S. at 637 n.5 (per curiam) ("We
reserve again the question whether or in what circumstances mandatory death
sentence statutes may be constitutionally applied to prisoners serving life sentences.");
Roberts I, 428 U.S. at 334 n.9 (Stevens opinion) ("Only the third category of the
Louisiana first-degree murder statute, covering intentional killing by a person serving
a life sentence . . . defines the capital crime at least in significant part in terms
of the character or record of the individual offender. Although even this narrow
category does not permit the jury to consider possible mitigating factors, a prisoner
serving a life sentence presents a unique problem that may justify such a law.");
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287 n.7 (Stewart opinion) ("This case does not involve a
mandatory death penalty statute limited to an extremely narrow category of homicide,
such as murder by a prisoner serving a life sentence, defined in large part in terms
of the character or record of the offender. We thus express no opinion regarding
the constitutionality of such a statute."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (Stewart opinion)
("And there are some categories of murder, such as murder by a life prisoner, where
other sanctions may not be adequate."). See also supra note 154 and accompanying
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In Smith, the court of appeals applied the guidelines established
by the Supreme Court in its post-Furman decisions' 6° and concluded
that New York's mandatory death statute for lifers was unconsti-
tutional "because of its failure to provide for the consideration of
individual circumstances' ' 16' by requiring the sentencing authority to
consider mitigating and aggravating factors. 62 The court of appeals
next distinguished the recent lifer reservation in Lockett v. Ohio
63
from the case at bar.'64 In Lockett, the Supreme Court suggested that
the need to deter certain kinds of homicide, such as murder by a
prisoner serving a life term, might justify a mandatory death penalty.'65
However, as the court of appeals noted, a life sentence is nof-
the equivalent of life imprisonment in New York, 66 and thus the
need for deterrence from further crimes expressed in Lockett did
not justify a mandatory death statute in New York. 167 Because life-
text where the Davis court reserved judgment on this section of New York's man-
datory death statute.
160. See supra notes 79-122 and accompanying text. The New York Court of
Appeals relied most heavily on the Supreme Court ruling in Woodson, 428 U.S.
280 (1976) (Stewart opinion).
161. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 78, 468 N.E.2d at 898, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
162. Id. at 78-79, 468 N.E.2d at 898, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 725. The New York Court
of Appeals again rejected the State's contention that the statutory affirmative
defenses were mitigating factors. Id. at 78, 468 N.E.2d at 897-98, 479 N.Y.S.2d
at 724-25. This argument had been rejected earlier in the Davis decision. See supra
notes 151-52 and accompanying text. However, Judge Simons in dissent found that
the New York statute met the constitutional requirements because it covered only
intentional homicide and included within the definition of the offense an indivi-
dualized consideration of the offender: he must be over eighteen years of age and
have previously committed a crime serious enough to warrant a maximum sentence
of life imprisonment. In addition, he noted that the statute covered an exceptional
category of homicide where the jury was not required to consider mitigating factors.
Id. at 83, 468 N.E.2d at 901, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
163. 438 U.S. at 604 n.ll (plurality opinion); see supra note 159 and accompany-
ing text.
164. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 75-77, 468 N,E.2d at 896-97, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 723-24.
165. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.1l (plurality opinion).
166. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 76, 468 N.E.2d at 896, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 723. Diverse
crimes are classified as A-I felonies and are punishable by a miminum sentence
of fifteen years and a maximum sentence of life. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney
1975); see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.20 (McKinney 1975) (arson); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 135.25 (McKinney 1975) (kidnapping).
167. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 468 N.E.2d at 896, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 723. The
New York Court of Appeals noted that even if this deterrence was necessary in
the case of a life-term inmate with no possibility of parole who could not otherwise
be punished, it did not apply to this New York defendant because he was eligible
for parole in nineteen years, when he would be only sixty-three years old. Smith,
63 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 468 N.E.2d at 896, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 723. Perhaps this is the
reason the Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
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term inmates in New York consisted of a wide variety of persons
with diverse backgrounds and prior criminal experiences, 68 the court
of appeals Concluded that these life-term prisoners were not a "face-
less, undifferentiated mass,"' 169 and that "society ha[d] no less mo-
tivation to avoid irrevocable error in fixing the appropriate penalty
for life-term inmates than other human beings."' 70 The court sug-
gested that a discretionary death penalty, which allowed for a con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual offender as
well as the particular offense, would meet constitutional standards
without detracting from the deterrent value of capital punishment 7'
because the defendant's status as a life-term inmate would always
be a powerful aggravating circumstance. 72 The court noted that "[a]
mandatory death statute simply [could] not be reconciled with the
scrupulous care the legal system demand[ed] to insure that the death
penalty fit the individual and the crime."' 173 Relying on post-Furman
Supreme Court death penalty cases and distinguishing the case at
bar from one which might fall under the Supreme Court's lifer
reservation, the New York State Court of Appeals invalidated the
only remaining portion of New York's mandatory death penalty
statute as violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution.' 71
IV. The Supreme Court's Lifer Reservation:
No Longer an Open Question?
A. The New York Statute Measured Against Supreme Court
Guidelines
The Smith decision was consistent with results reached by other
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).
170. Id. at 76, 468 N.E.2d at 896-97, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 723-24.
171. Id. at 77, 468 N.E.2d at 897, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 78, 468 N.E.2d at 897, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
174. Because the New York Court of Appeals decided the case on the basis of
the Federal Constitution, it once again did not reach the issue of constitutionality
under the New York State Constitution. Id. at 78-79, 468 N.E.2d at 898, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 725. See also supra note 147 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the same ruling in Davis.
Note, however, that it was a 4-3 opinion and that the dissenting judges found
the statute constitutional. See Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 81, 468 N.E.2d at 899, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 726 (Simons, J., dissenting) ("I dissent .. .because [the] defendant
has failed to establish that section 60.06 of the Penal Law fixing the penalty for
first-degree murder ... is unconstitutional."); id. at 92, 468 N.E.2d at 906, 479
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state courts.'75 However, the constitutionality of this narrow category
of mandatory death statute still has not been settled by the United
States Supreme Court. The Court's repeated reservation of judgment
implies that it might decide that this type of statute is constitutional.
Nevertheless, it has not upheld any type of mandatory death statute
since Furman. 17 6
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically prescribed the re-
quirements for a constitutionally valid death penalty statute, three
themes have emerged in its post-Furman decisions: (1) the need to
focus on the individual offender and offense;'" (2) the desirability
of expeditious appellate review;' 78 and (3) the practicality of a bifur-
cated proceeding where guilt and penalty are considered separately.' 79
Since New York's mandatory death statute contains none of these
three provisions, it is difficult to see how it could survive Supreme
Court scrutiny.
In defense of the New York statute, it might be argued that
because of the singular nature of the crime covered by the statute80
and because the crime includes by definition an individualized con-
sideration of offender and offense,' 8 ' the statute is constitutionally
valid. 8 2 The statute specifically provides that a life-term prisoner
can receive the death penalty for the crime of murder in New York
only if he is over eighteen years of age'83 and has previously
committed a crime of sufficient magnitude to warrant a sentence
of life imprisonment.' 4 The Supreme Court has implied that in this
N.Y.S.2d at 733 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree, however, that section
60.06 of the Penal Law . . . is unconstitutional."); see also supra note 161.
175. Id. at 78-79 n.9, 468 N.E.2d at 898 n.9, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 725 n.9. See
infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of these opinions.
176. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIM. 754-85 (1983), which discusses the radically different ways courts interpret
capital judicial review; ABANDONING THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS AND CONSISTENCY,
supra note 124, at 1186-1201, for a discussion of recent developments in state
appellate review procedures which have increased the potential for unfairness and
inconsistency in death sentencing.
179. See supra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
180. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(i)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1975), supra note 138.
181. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(iii), (b).
182. See Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 83 n.2, 468 N.E.2d at 897 n.2, 479 N.Y.S.2d at
728 n.2 (Simons, J., dissenting) (distinguishing subdivision of mandatory death statute
invalidated in Davis because latter failed to take into account character of offender).
183. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(b) (McKinney 1975), supra note 138.
184. Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(iii).
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narrow category of homicide the jury might not be required to
consider mitigating factors before imposing a sentence of death.'85
Yet it would be difficult to reconcile such a ruling with Roberts II,
where the singular nature of the crime of intentionally killing a
peace officer was not enough to validate the statute.186 Although
the Roberts II Court viewed the victim's status as a police officer
as a powerful aggravating circumstance, it concluded that a con-
sideration of mitigating evidence relating to the defendant was also
required. 87 The importance of treating each person as an individual
pervades the Court's post-Furman death penalty decisions.' 88 New
York's definition of the crime and limitation of the death sentence
to a life-term prisoner over the age of eighteen seems inadequate
to meet the test of constitutionality.
Two additional deficiencies in the New York statute are its limited
appellate procedures and its failure to make provisions for a bi-
furcated proceeding. Although a defendant can directly appeal a
jury verdict for first degree murder to the New York State Court of
Appeals, 18 9 there is no appeal of the death sentence once guilt has
been established.' 90 Further, the sentencing authority is not required
to weigh all of the aggravating and mitigating factors regarding the
offender and the offense in a penalty hearing separate from the
guilt phase of the trial.' 91
New York's mandatory death penalty statute for convicts serving
life-term sentences on murder convictions thus resembles the death
statutes previously struck down by the Supreme Court 92 more closely
than those which have been upheld' 3 and does not appear to follow
any of the guidelines set forth by the Court in its post-Furman
decisions.
B. The Mandatory Death Penalty for Lifers in Other
Jurisdictions
The New York State Court of Appeals noted in Smith that other
federal and state courts similarly had determined that the mandatory
185. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
189. See N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 3(b).
190. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1975), supra note 138.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
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imposition of death on a life-term prisoner who commits murder
was unconstitutional. 194 For example, in Shuman v. Wolff, 195 a United
States district court found Nevada's mandatory death statute, which.
required the death penalty for a life-term prisoner convicted of first
degree murder, to be unconstitutional.' 9 6 The district court held that
"[i]mposing mandatory capital punishment for the life term prisoner
who intentionally kills is to consider but one aspect of the character
and record of the individual while ignoring totally the circumstances
of the crime for which he is being sentenced."' 197 The district court
noted that the availability of the death penalty was a sufficient
deterrent for the life prisoner and that its imposition need not be
mandatory.' 9 8
In State v. Cline,'99 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island declared
unconstitutional 200 a Rhode Island law which provided for a man-
datory death sentence for any prisoner in a state correctional in-
stitution or a state reformatory for women who committed murder
while in prison. 201 Because the statute did not allow consideration
of any mitigating factors before a sentence of death was imposed,
it was held to be violative of the eighth amendment. 20 2
A mandatory death statute in California which failed to provide
for a consideration of mitigating factors also was held to be un-
constitutional. 20 3 Although the California statute applied only to a
malicious assault resulting in the death of a non-inmate by a person
serving a life sentence, the court did not find these aggravating
circumstances sufficient to overcome the absence of mitigating fac-
tors. 204 The court noted that the classification of life-prisoner covered
a broad range of culpabilities and that under California's indeter-
minate sentencing law all life prisoners had the possibility of release
194. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 78-79 n.9, 468 N.E.2d at 898 n.9, 479 N.Y.S.2d at
725 n.9 (court of appeals justifies decision in case by pointing to other court
rulings).
195. Shuman v. Wolff, 571 F. Supp. 213 (D. Nev. 1983) (appeal pending).
196. Id. at 217-18.
197. Id. at 217.
198. Id.
199. State v. Cline, 121 R.I. 299, 397 A.2d 1309 (1979).
200. Id. at 303, 397 A.2d at 1311.
201. Id. at 300-01, 397 A.2d at 1310.
202. Id. at 299-300, 303, 397 A.2d at 1309, 1311. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court noted that "a review of the Supreme Court's pronouncements makes it clear
that a death sentence imposed by a sentencer who is not statutorily authorized to
consider mitigating circumstances is a nullity." Id. at 303, 397 A.2d at 1311.
203. Graham v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 880, 888, 160 Cal. Rptr. 10,
14 (1979).
204. Id. at 888, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
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on parole, regardless of the crime committed. 05 Accordingly, it was
essential for the trial judge before imposing a sentence of death, to
consider potentially mitigating factors such as the age of the de-
fendant, his degree of direct involvement in the assault, the extent
of premeditation and deliberation in the commission of the crime,
the influence of drugs, alcohol, or mental illness, whether any form
of duress existed, whether the defendant reasonably believed his act
was morally justified, and whether there was any provocation. 20 6
Moreover, the court noted that there was no need for a mandatory
death penalty to protect the prison guards from assault by a life
prisoner 20 7 because under California's indeterminate sentencing law,
the state had available as a deterrent the postponement of the parole
date.201
It is significant to note that most of the mandatory death statutes
for life-term prisoners enacted after Furman are no longer in ex-
istence. 20 9 Some have been repealed or amended by state legislatures210
while others have been held to be unconstitutional by state courts. 21'
Therefore, despite the Supreme Court's reservation of judgment on
the constitutionality of these statutes, 212 state legislatures and courts
are interpreting the Court's guidelines to preclude a mandatory death
sentence for life-term prisoners who commit murder. 213
205. Id. at 886, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 13. This situation is similar to that in New
York. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
206. Graham, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 887, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
207. Id., 160 Cal. Rptr. at 13-14.
208. Id., 160 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
209. See supra notes 64, 160-62 and accompanying text.
210. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-13-4-1(b)(6)(iv) (Burns 1973) (amended and codified
as guided discretion statute, IND. CODE ANN. §§-35-50-2-3 to -9 (Burns 1984)); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(3) (West 1974) (amended and codified as guided discretion
statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN, § 14:30 (West Supp. 1985)); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.030(l)(b) (1973) (currently discretionary statute applicable to any prisoner, NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 200.030(4)(a), 200.033, 200.035 (1983)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.1(7) (West 1973) (repealed 1976, currently codified as discretionary statute,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.7, 701.9-701.15 (West 1983)); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-
10(a), 18.2-31(c) (1975) (murder by any prisoner), 53-291(1) (murder of prison employee
by inmate (§ 18.2-18.10 was amended in 1977; § 53-291(1) was repealed; the current
discretionary statute is codified at VA. CODE §§ 18.2-10(a), 18.2-31, 19.2-264.2,
19.2-264.4 (1984 Supp.)); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54(b), (v) (Supp. 1973) (current discre-
tionary statute codified at Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to -103 (1983)).
211. See supra notes 160-62, 195-208 and accompanying text; see also Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-19(2)(b) (1984) (judicially amended to survive as guided discretion
statute in Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242, 1253-57 (Miss. 1976, codified at Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-21, 99-19-103, 99-19-105, 99-19-107 (1984)).
212. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 160-62, 195-208, & 210-11 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XIII
MANDA TOR Y DEATH PENAL TY
V. The Pros and Cons of a Mandatory Death Penalty for Lifers
A discussion of death penalty statutes invariably involves more
than strictly legal considerations. Thus, even if New York's man-
datory death penalty statute, which is of doubtful constitutionality
as drafted, could survive Supreme Court scrutiny, the question would
still remain whether it is necessary or desirable. The larger debate
regarding capital punishment focuses on the moral, penological, and
sociological arguments offered by proponents and opponents of the
death penalty.2"" These factors also must be considered in relation
to a mandatory death statute for life-term prisoners.
A. In Favor of the Death Penalty
Proponents of capital punishment have raised a number of ar-
guments in support of the death penalty. First, advocates contend
that "the primary responsibility of society is the protection of its
members so that they may live out their lives in peace and safety"2' 5
and that to protect its citizenry, society must use whatever means
necessary, including the death penalty.2"6 Because a life sentence in
New York is not the equivalent of imprisonment for the duration
of one's natural life, it is highly possible that a life-inmate could be
released on parole.2" Therefore, proponents argue that the death pen-
alty is the only way to assure that lifers do not pose a continuing
threat to society. Because some criminals are incorrigibly anti-social
and therefore potentially dangerous to society for the remainder of
their lives, advocates of capital punishment suggest that imprisonment
is not a sufficient safeguard against commission of future crimes by
214. See generally Copple, Krivosha, McDonough, A Historical and Philosophical
Look at the Death Penalty-Does It Serve Society's Needs?, 16 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1-46 (1982-83) (reviews history of death penalty to determine if it is deterrent
to crime; after considering factors other than constitutionality of capital punishment,
authors conclude that life imprisonment is more justifiable means of punishment
than death penalty); Schoenfeld, The Desire to Abolish Capital Punishment: A
Psychoanalytically Oriented Analysis, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 151-81 (1983)
(discussion of theories of deterrence, rehabilitation, mistake, discrimination, and
arbitrariness in imposition of death penalty; article finds flaws in arguments of
abolitionists in these areas and concludes that death penalty is necessary in order
to serve justice for majority of society).
215. Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Capital Punishment as a Matter
of Legislative Policy in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA at 311 (H. Bedau 3d ed.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate].
216. Id.
217. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
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these persons.2"8 Based on this concern, a mandatory death sentence
is particularly appropriate for a life-term prisoner who commits
murder. Additionally, it is argued that the death penalty is needed
to maintain order and discipline in the prisons." 9 Without the death
penalty as a sanction for assault or murder,22 0 proponents argue that
prison guards would be at the mercy of the inmates especially in the
case of a life-term prisoner.'
Another justification for the use of the death penalty is the
increasing public support for this method of punishment. 22 Polls
indicate that since the Furman decision in 1972, Americans have
increasingly supported capital punishment as a sanction for the crime
of murder. 23 Some of the reasons offered for society's acceptance
of the death penalty include the increase in violent crime in the
218. See Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate, supra note 215, at 315.
219. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 94, 468 N.E.2d at 908, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (Cooke,
C.J., dissenting); See-Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate, supra note 215, at
315.
220. See Graham v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 887, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
13. This was the argument used by the People to justify a mandatory death sentence
for a life-term prisoner. The California Court of Appeals rejected the argument
because the life prisoner under California's indeterminate sentencing law was eligible
for parole. This factor was determined to be sufficient protection for the guards
who were involved in the decision to deny or grant parole. See supra notes 207-
08 and accompanying text. -
221. See Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate, supra note 215, at 315.
222. See generally Tyler & Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental
Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 L. & Soc'Y REv. 21-45 (1982-83)
(study of rationale underlying public support of death penalty). The authors conclude
that basic political and social values, rather than crime-related concerns, are the
predominant reasons for public support for or opposition to the death penalty.
Id.
223. Gallup polls from 1936-1981 asking whether Americans favored the death
penalty for murder resulted in the following percentages of Americans in favor of
this sanction: 1936 - 61%, 1953 - 6807o, 1956 - 53%, 1960 - 51%, 1965 - 45%,
1966 - 42%, 1972 - 57%, 1976 - 65%, 1981 - 66%. ISAACSON, PRO AND CON 68,
72 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRO AND CON]. A Gallup poll taken in the fall of
1982 showed 72% of Americans in favor of capital punishment. Andersen, An
Eye for an Eye, TIME, Jan. 24, 1983, at 28 [hereinafter cited as An Eye for an
Eye].
The percentage of New Yorkers favoring the death penalty is somewhat lower
than the national average. A New York Times poll taken in January, 1985 found
that 47% of New Yorkers favored the death penalty. McFadden, Poll Indicates
Half of New Yorkers See Crime as City's Chief Problem, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
1985, at Al, col. 1.
See generally Vidmar & Ellsworth, Research on Attitudes Toward Capital Pun-
ishment in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA at 68-92 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982). See
Table 3-2-3 concerning attitudes toward the mandatory use of capital punishment
for the selected crimes of murder, skyjacking, rape and mugging. Id. at 89. The
626 [Vol. XIII
MANDA TOR Y DEATH PENAL TY
past twenty years, 224 the heightened concern for personal safety and
property resulting from this increase, 225 public reaction to a series
of assassinations and attempted assassinations of prominent national
leaders and innocent victims2 26 and the many years of the discontinua-
tion of capital punishment.227 Increased support for the death penalty
has been accompanied by a marked increase in executions in. the past
few years. For example, in 1984 alone there were more executions than
there had been since 1963.228 The growing acceptance by society of
the death penalty for the crime of murder easily might be used to
justify a mandatory sentence for life-term prisoners. These inmates,
who have already committed crimes serious enough to warrant
sentences of life-imprisonment, are unlikely to receive sympathy from
the great majority of American citizens.
Society's increasing acceptance of the death penalty is based in part
on the theory of retribution 2 9 whereby an offender is expected to receive
the punishment he deserves based on the community's perception
of the gravity of his offense. 230 According to this theory, society
expresses its outrage and revulsion towards those who violate the
law through punishment.2 3 ' As noted by the Supreme Court in Gregg,
chart shows an increased support for a mandatory death penalty for murder of a
policeman or prison guard and for first degree murder from 1973-77. Id.
224. Between 1960 and 1973 the U.S. homicide rate doubled, from 4.7 murders
per 100,000 people to 9.4. The rate has leveled off and was at 9.8 per 100,000
in January of 1983. An Eye for an Eye, supra note 223, at 28.
225. Id. at 28-29.
226. Schwarzschild, In Opposition to Death Penalty Legislation in THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 364-65 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as In Opposi-
tion to Death Penalty Legislation].
227. Id.
228. Riley, The Year in Law: 1984, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 31, 1984, at 48, col. 1. As
of mid-December, twenty inmates, including the first woman in-twenty-two years,
had been executed. Goodman, Pace of Executions in U.S. Quickens, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 1984, at A18, col. 1. Between December 14, 1983 and December 13, 1984
more than twice as many Americans had been executed than in the past twenty
years. Id.; see also Bedau, supra note 29, at 56-62 (showing number of prisoners
executed under civil authority in United States from 1930-80).
229. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The instinct for
retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the
administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment
they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy . . ").
230. See Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 88-89, 468 N.E.2d at 904, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 731
(Simons, J., dissenting).
231. Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate, supra note 215, at 315 (retribution
"reflects the fact that criminals have not simply inflicted injury upon discrete
individuals; they have also weakened the often tenuous bonds that hold communities
together").
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some crimes are considered to be so outrageous that society finds
death to be the only acceptable punishment.232 A subsequent murder
by a life-term prisoner would, under this view, be one of those
outrageous crimes for which society would want to exact the ultimate
punishment of death.
A fourth justification for the use of a mandatory death penalty
for life-term prisoners is deterrence. The Supreme Court has noted
that it is appropriate for a state legislature to consider deterrence
as a justification for imposing the death penalty especially when no
other sanctions are available. 23 3 The Court further has stated that
deterrence might be an acceptable reason for imposing a mandatory
death sentence on a life-inmate convicted of murder. 2 4 In response
to arguments that statistical evidence shows no real correlation be-
tween the existence of the death penalty and the frequency of capital
crime,235 proponents reply that the deterrent value is obvious. 23 6 "Of
But see Amsterdam, Capital Punishment in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
352-53 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Capital Punishment] (arguing
that retribution is achieved not only by death penalty but also by other sanctions);
In Opposition to Death Penalty Legislation, supra note 226, at 369 (arguing that
gratifying impulse for revenge is not business of democratic government).
232. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (Stewart opinion).
233. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (Stewart opinion) ("In part, capital punishment is
an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This
function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society
that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate
their wrongs.") (footnote omitted); id. at 185-86 ("We may nevertheless assume
safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the
threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death
penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated
murders, such as murder for hire, where the possibile penalty of death may well
enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. And there are some
categories of murder, such as murder by a life prisoner, where other sanctions
may not be adequate.") (footnote omitted).
234. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.ll (plurality opinion); see supra notes 159, 163,
165 and accompanying text.
235. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184-85 (Stewart opinion) ("Statistical attempts to
evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential
offenders have occasioned a great deal of debate. The results simply have been
inconclusive.") (footnote omitted); see also Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of the Evidence in THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA at 138-59 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982) (article contains bibliography
of other references on deterrent effect of capital punishment. Id. at 158-59). But
see Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate, supra note 211, at 312. ("With regard
to the statistical evidence, the first and most obvious point is that those who are,
in fact, deterred by the threat of the death penalty and do not commit murder
are not included in the statistical data."). See generally Forst, Capital Punishment
and Deterrence: Conflicting Evidence, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 927-42 (1983) (studies
influence of death penalty on homicide rates).
236. PRO AND CON, supra note 223, at 67.
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all permissible punishments, death is undoubtedly the most feared;
almost all so sentenced plead for commutation to life imprison-
ment. 23 7 Regardless of whether the death penalty is truly a deterrent
for a life-term prisoner with a predisposition towards further crime,23
this argument is of limited application in New. York due to the
indeterminate sentencing system. The loss of parole for a life prisoner
may serve as an alternative deterrent to subsequent murder by a
life-term inmate. 239
Proponents of capital punishment thus offer protection, public
acceptance, and deterrence as the primary justifications for the death
penalty. For them, the sanction of death is the only way to assure
that society and its values are permanently protected from those
who have murdered. In the case of a life-term prisoner who has
already proven his proclivity for serious crime, the need for protection
becomes even greater.
B. In Opposition to the Death Penalty
Opponents of the death penalty emphasize the immorality and
inequity of capital punishment, the possibility of executing either
an innocent person or the wrong one and the death penalty's failure
to deter serious crime such as murder.
Opponents would accept neither a mandatory nor a discretionary
death penalty for life-term prisoners who commit murder. They
argue that "[rieverence for human life is part of the moral foundation
of a just society, ' ' 240 and that it is wrong for the state to take away
the life of a human being. 241 They point to evidence that increases
in executions have resulted in a diminished respect for human life,242
and consequently, in an increase in homicide.2 43 It has been said
that the death penalty creates an atmosphere of brutality that en-
courages violent behavior244 which would be an especially serious
problem in a prison environment.
237. Id.
238. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
240. PRO AND CON, supra note 223, at 69.
241. Id. See generally CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 127-39 (1978)
(discussing morality of capital punishment).
242. PRO AND CON, supra note 223, at 70.
243. "Recently, there were notable increases in the murder rate in Utah, Florida,
and Indiana, during the six-month period following well publicized executions in
those places." Id. For example, the homicide rate rose 14% in Florida in 1979
following the execution of John Spenklink. Id.
244. See THE FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROGRAM,
INSTEAD OF THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (1984).
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A second concern of opponents of capital punishment is the
inequitable imposition of the death penalty. 245 A disproportionately
large number of blacks have been executed in the United States2 46
while the number of women put to death has been disproportionately
low. 247 Furthermore, almost all prisoners on death row are poor241
and relatively uneducated, 249 and there is the "ever present danger
that anyone against whom, for any reason, conscious or unconscious
prejudice exists will come off worse than a person against whom
245. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (expressing view
that it is cruel and unusual to apply death penalty selectively to minorities as has
been case) "[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation.
They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws . . . ." Id. at 256-57.
See generally BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 84-91 (1974) (discussing negative impact
of race and poverty on imposition of death penalty) [hereinafter cited as CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT].
246. "At the time of Furman (1972) it was widely recognized that the system
was unquestionably stacked against black defendants, especially in the 'death belt'
of the South." An Eye For An Eye, supra note 223, at 38; see also Furman, 408
U.S. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Between 1968 and 1975 the proportion of death row inmates who were black
exceeded 5007o; it dropped to 4607o in 1976, 45076 in 1977 and 4106 in 1978. See
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1983, supra note 124, at 4. Since 1978, the proportion of
black death-row inmates has been two in five prisoners. In 1983, of the 1202
persons on death row, 500 were black. Id.
One of the legal challenges still in the federal courts is the argument that the
death penalty is used most frequently when the victim is white. See Press, Rate
of Executions Picks Up in U.S., Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 15, 1984, at 3;
see also Kill Him, 4-4, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1985, at A22, col. 1 (editorial
questioning January, 1985 execution of black man in Georgia and noting "[tihe
system is racially biased; the death penalty is much more likely in cases where the
victim was white rather than black").
247. At the time of Furman (1972) only four women were on death row. CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1983, supra note 124, at 4. That number increased only slightly from
1972 until November, 1984, when there were sixteen out of a total of 1420 inmates
on death row. 16 Women Await the Death Penalty in the U.S., N.Y. Times,
November 3, 1984, at 46, col. 1. When Margie Velma Barfield was executed in
North Carolina on Nov. 2, 1984, she became the first woman to be executed in
the United States in twenty-five years. See Schmidt, Woman Executed in the United
States for First Time Since 1962, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1984, at 46, col. 1.
248. Bedau, The Case Against the Death Penalty in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PRO-
CESSES at 514 (1983). A study of post-Furman death row inmates showed the following:
6201o were unskilled, service, or domestic workers, while only 3076 were professional
or technical workers; 600 were unemployed at the time of their crimes. Id. In North
Carolina, for example, the vast majority was represented by appointed counsel, most
of whom had less than five years of legal experience. Id. at 514.
249. As of December, 1983 only 41076 of the inmates on death row nationwide
had completed high school, while one in ten had not graduated from the eighth
grade. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1983, supra note 124, at 4.
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such feeling does not exist. ' 25 0 A life-term prisoner who commits
murder would be a potential victim of this "conscious or unconscious
prejudice," as most people would not be sympathetically disposed
toward a felon who has committed at least two serious crimes.
Another concern is that the death penalty imposes unreasonable
risks of executing either the wrong person or an innocent person.25'
Additionally, there is the problem of changing norms of acceptable
punishments." 2 For example, in 1977, the Supreme Court held that
the death .penalty was excessively harsh and, therefore, unconstitu-
tional for the crime of rape. 253 However, 455 men were executed for
this crime between 1930 and 1977.254 In light of the everpresent danger
of mistake or changing norms, opponents of capital punishment urge
that the death penalty be eliminated for all categories of offenders
and offenses.
That the death penalty has not been proven to deter crime is a
fourth argument raised by opponents of capital punishment. 255 With
regard to prison homicide, 256 studies show that the threat of a
mandatory death penalty does not deter premeditated prison mur-
der. 257 The uncertainty of actual punishment for a prison homicide,
the doubtful constitutionality of mandatory death statutes, and the
infrequent use of the death penalty since the 1960's have weakened
250. Black, Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake in
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 513 (1983). See generally Paternoster, Race of
Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South
Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 754-85 (1983) (concluding that prosecutor's
decision to seek death penalty is significantly related to race of victim).
251. See Abramovsky, People v. Smith-The Death Penalty in New York,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 31, 1984, at 2, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as People v. Smith-The
Death Penalty in New York]. See generally CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 245,
at 9-22, which discusses the possibility of mistake in inflicting the death penalty
and the arbitrary way in which it is imposed.
252. See Capital Punishment, supra note 231, at 350.
253. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
254. Capital Punishment, supra note 231, at 350.
255. See generally Bailey, Disaggregation in Deterrence and Death Penalty Re-
search: The Case of Murder in Chicago, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 827-59 (1983)
(discussing deterrence by analyzing crime statistics in Chicago); McFarland, Is Capital
Punishment a Short-Term Deterrent to Homicide? A Study of the Effects of Four
Recent American Executions, id. at 1014-32 (studies short-term effects of executions
of Gary Gilmore (1977), John Spenkelink (1979), Jesse Bishop (1979), and Steven
Judy (1981) on homicide rates).
256. See generally Deterrent Effect of Death Penalty Upon Prison Murder, supra
note 63, at 159-73 (discussing failure of death penalty to deter homicide in prison).
257. Id. at 160-71.
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whatever deterrent effect a death sentence might have had. 28 The
Supreme Court's recognition of deterrence as the only possible jus-
tification for a mandatory death penalty for life-term prisoners who
murder25 9 is counterbalanced by studies denying that a mandatory
death penalty has any deterrent effect on the prison population.
Finally, it is significant that murders by life-term inmates have
occurred at roughly the same rate in states with mandatory death
penalty statutes, discretionary death penalty statutes, and no death
penalty at all.260
The questionable deterrent value of the mandatory death penalty
for lifers and the lack of data supporting its value for maintaining
order in the prisons, together with the inability of the statute to satisfy
Supreme Court guidelines, eliminate the mandatory death penalty as
a viable sanction for life-term prisoners who murder in New York.
VI. Alternatives to a Mandatory Death Penalty for Life-Term
Prisoners Who Murder
There are two feasible alternatives to New York's mandatory death
statute for life-term prisoners who murder. First, the state legislators
could rewrite the penal law as a "guided" discretion statute which
comports with the Supreme Court guidelines. 261 The second alternative
is for the legislature to establish a system of determinate sentencing
under which a convicted criminal could be sentenced to life im-
prisonment without parole. 262
In Smith, the New York State Court of Appeals implied that a
discretionary death penalty statute, which allowed for a consideration
of the character and record of the life-term inmate, as well as the
circumstances of the particular murder committed, might meet with
its approval. 263 The New York court observed that, because execution
258. Id. at 170-71. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that even the unofficial
death penalty, which is frequently used by one inmate within the prison as retaliation
against another, has failed to deter crime despite its high degree of certainty. Id.
259. See supra notes 159, 163, 165, 234 and accompanying text.
260. Note, The Constitutionality of the Mandatory Death Penalty for Life-Term
Prisoners Who Murder, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 636, 658 n.145 (1980); see also Deterrent
Effect of Death Penalty Upon Prison Murder, supra note 63, at 169 (note especially
Table 4-4-5 comparing murders in U.S. prisons in 1973 in jurisdictions with man-
datory, discretionary, and no death penalty).
261. The Supreme Court noted in Gregg that a carefully drafted statute which
ensured that the sentencing authority was given adequate information and guidance
would be acceptable. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (Stewart opinion); see infra notes
263-72, 287-89, 295-302 and accompanying text.
262. See infra notes 273-85 and accompanying text.
263. See Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 77, 468 N.E.2d at 897, 479 N.Y.S. 2d at 724;
see also People v. Smith-The Death Penalty in New York, supra note 251, at 1,
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was never the inevitable result of a criminal act,216 a discretionary
death penalty would differ little in deterrent value from a mandatory
one.265 The court of appeals refused to read into the statute a
provision for a consideration of mitigating circumstances, 266 but it
implied that it would uphold a discretionary statute. 267
To comport with Supreme Court guidelines and to satisfy the
court of appeals, the new statute should include three provisions: 268
(1) a listing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances to be con-
sidered by the sentencing authority; 269 (2) a bifurcated hearing on
col. I ("There is much in both the majority and two dissenting opinions to indicate
that a differently constructed statute could win the approval of the current Court").
264. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 77, 468 N.E.2d at 897, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 724 ("In
every case, including one where the death sentence is mandatory upon conviction,
it is only the specter of execution which can serve as a general deterrent."). Even
in the case of a mandatory death penalty, execution is never more than a possibility
for an individual about to commit a crime. The culprit may never get caught, the
grand jury may not indict for a capital offense, the District Attorney may consent
to a guilty plea to a non-capital offense, the petit jury may return a verdict of
not guilty, the appellate court may reverse the sentence, or the executive may
commute the death penalty. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 79, 468 N.E.2d at 898, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
267. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 79-122, 177-91 and accompanying text.
269. For a sample list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which might
be included in a discretionary death penalty statute, see MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.6 (3)(4) (1962).
(3) Aggravating Circumstances
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under a sentence of
imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
another murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was
an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting ex-
ceptional depravity.
(4) Mitigating Circumstances
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
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the issues of guilt and penalty; and (3) some provision for an
expedited review of the death sentence. Whereas a bifurcated pro-
ceeding and appellate review have never been mandated by the
Supreme Court, 270 both provisions were present in the discretionary
statutes upheld by the Court.2 1' Although this type of statute would
never be acceptable to opponents of capital punishment, it should
satisfy most advocates of the death penalty because "any defendant's
status as a life-term inmate would constitute a powerful aggravating
circumstance and undoubtedly increase the likelihood that the sen-
tencer would find the death penalty appropriate under all the cir-
cumstances. "272
A second alternative to New York's mandatory death penalty is
a system of determinate sentencing which would include a penalty
of life imprisonment without parole. 273 Under this law, prison terms
would not be reviewed or reduced by a parole board but would be
set at the time the judge announced the sentence.2 74 Nine states
employ this approach today,2 75 and by 1986, the federal government
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person.(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform to the re-
quirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect
or intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id.
270. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also LEGISLATING A DEATH
PENALTY, supra note 82, at 18-19.
271. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
272. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 77, 468 N.E.2d at 897, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
273. A determinate sentencing system is intended to insure that criminals with
similar records who commit the same crime receive the same sentence from all
judges. See generally Gargan, System of Fixed Sentences Proposed, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1985, at B3, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as System of Fixed Sentences Proposed].
274. 'PANEL ON SENTENCING RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH
FOR REFORM 133 (1983).
275. Id. at 133-34. The states are Alaska, California, Colorado, Indiana, Illinois,
Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, and North Carolina. However, these states have
a wide variety of determinate sentencing systems. Id. at 134. For example, at one
end of the spectrum is Maine which abolished its parole board in 1975. Id. Except
for the maximum sentences specified for each class of felonies, there is no established
criteria for judges to guide them in their sentencing decisions. Id. At the other
extreme is California which has detailed statutory sentencing standards. Under the
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law, judges can choose one of three "base terms"
for persons convicted of a particular offense. The middle term is used for ordinary
offenses, while the higher and lower ones are used when there are aggravating or
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also will have determinate sentencing. 276
The New York State Committee on Sentencing Guidelines, ap-
pointed by the governor and state legislature in 1983, recently announced
its proposal for a determinate sentencing system in New York. 277 At
the core of its recommendation is a table that assigns a range of
sentences to each crime based on the offense committed and the
prior criminal record of the offender. 7 8 Only under extraordinary
circumstances would a judge be allowed to lengthen or shorten the
sentence mandated by law.2 79 In addition to this determinate sent-
encing system, Governor Cuomo has asked the legislature to pass
a law establishing a sentence of life without parole, since in his
view this sanction is a far more effective deterrent to the crime of
murder than the death penalty.2 10
An analysis of a determinate' sentencing system, which includes
a penalty of life without parole, reveals both positive and negative
factors. The positive features include the curtailment of judicial
discretion, the reduction in sentencing disparities, the certainty of
mitigating circumstances. Id. For a discussion and criticism of other determinate
sentencing systems, see Zimring, Sentencing Reform in the States: Lessons from
the 1970's in REFORM AND PUNISHMENT (M. Tonry & F. Zimring 1983).
276. See Riley, U.S. Changes the Rules on Crime, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 29, 1984,
at 27, col. 1.
Congress passed a comprehensive anti-crime package in October, 1984, which
provided for the establishment of a U.S. Sentencing Commission to set a narrow
range of sentences by 1986 based on offense and offender characteristics. Id. Unless
changed by Congress, the sentence ranges will be effective six months after they
are established, and judges will be required to follow them unless they explain in
writing why they did not. Both the government and the defendant will have the
right to appeal sentences which depart from the guidelines. The U.S. Parole Board
will be eliminated. Id.
277. See System of Fixed Sentences Imposed, supra note 273, at B3. The proposal
was announced on January 14, 1985. Id.
278. Id. (simplified version of chart judges would actually use is reproduced in
this article).
279. Id. The principal recommendations of the committee are as follows: (1)
judges would be given a narrow range of sentences for each type of crime; (2)
longer sentences would be required for convicted felons with a prior criminal record;
(3) the prosecutor could appeal sentences he determined to be too lenient; (4) judges
would be allowed to lengthen or shorten the mandated sentences in "extraordinary
cases;" (5) the maximum amount of good time off would be reduced from one-
third to one-quarter of the sentence; and (6) the parole board would be eliminated.
Id.
280. See Transcript of Cuomo State of the State Address to the Legislature,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1985, at B4 ("One proposal is . . . a deterrent to the ultimate
crime of murder . . . . It's life without parole, real life without parole. It's a
penalty that criminals fear more than the death penalty. And we can have it this
year if we're serious about a deterrent.").
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punishment 8 I and the elimination of parole for a life prisoner.28 2
On the negative side, there may be an undermining of judicial
authority and the potential for severe overcrowding in the state
prisons23 resulting in an unpredictable expense for the taxpayers.28 4
Critics of determinate sentencing note that in most states where the
system has been adopted, longer terms have resulted in overpopu-
lation of the state prisons.2 5 Furthermore, the removal of parole
from a life sentence makes it difficult to ignore the need for de-
terrence underlying the Supreme Court's lifer reservation. 28 6 Once
parole has become unavailable, the death penalty might be the only
way to deter life-term inmates from committing murder. For these
reasons, determinate sentencing is not an adequate alternative to New
York's mandatory death penalty.
A discretionary death statute which considers the character of the
individual offender as well as the nature of the offense appears to
be a more viable alternative.287 Both the United States Supreme Court288
281. See System of Fixed Sentences Proposed, supra note 273, at B3.
282. Under this system convicted felons whose crimes are determined to be so
heinous as to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment will not be returned to
society. Death penalty opponents would argue that a sentence this severe would
deter as many potential murderers as the death penalty. See An Eye For An Eye,
supra note 223, at 34, 36.
283. See System of Fixed Sentences Proposed, supra note 273, at B3; see also
Sentencing Convicts By Chart, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1985, at A24 (editorial con-
cerned about inability of state legislature to accurately predict number of prisoners
who will be in prisons as result of this law) [hereinafter cited as Sentencing Convicts
By Chart].
284. See Sentencing Convicts By Chart, supra note 283, at A24.
285. See System of Fixed Sentences Proposed, supra note 273, at B3; Sentencing
Convicts By Chart, supra note 283, at A24. The Sentencing Commission wants its
sentence chart to create a prison population of no more than 40,000 once current
expansions are completed. Id. It is presently costing New York $635,000,000 to
add 8600 new cells. Id. Even a slight miscalculation in the proposed chart could
add tens of thousands of new prisoners. Id.
286. See supra notes 159, 163, 165, 234, 259 and accompanying text.
287. Although a discretionary statute may be the best alternative, it ,is not likely
to be passed while Mario Cuomo is Governor of New York. Like his predecessor,
Hugh Carey, Governor Cuomo has threatened to veto any capital punishment
statute that the legislature passes. An Eye For An Eye, supra note 223, at 28;
see also Cuomo Plan Seeks Revival of Spirit of the New Deal, N.Y. Times, Jan.
10, 1985, at B5 (Governor Cuomo wrote that the death penalty "passes each year with
more than a majority and will no doubt pass by a substantial margin again this
year. I will veto it again.").
288. See supra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
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and the New York State Court of Appeals289 have made it clear that this
type of statute is constitutional. A discretionary statute would insure that
the defendant's status as a life prisoner would be given appropriate weight
as an aggravating circumstance while at the same time allowing
consideration of any mitigating factors that might affect the sent-
encing decision.
VII. Conclusion
The continued viability of a mandatory death penalty for life-
term prisoners who commit murder is uncertain. The only rationale
the Supreme Court has proffered to justify excepting a mandatory statute
for life-term prisoners who murder has been deterrence. 219 Assuming
that this rationale is viable, 291 it does not apply to a life-term prisoner
in New York who is eligible for parole under the state's indeterminate
sentencing scheme. 292
Singling out this class of criminal for the penalty of mandatory
death while not allowing this type of sanction for any other group
is arbitrary and discriminatory. Thus, in light of the Supreme Court
guidelines, it is difficult to see how New York's mandatory death
statute for life-term prisoners who murder can or should be con-
stitutionally acceptable. 291
A discretionary death penalty statute with provisions for a consid-
eration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances regarding the
life-term prisoner and murder committed, 294 a bifurcated proceeding,
289. See supra notes 171-72, 263-67 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 159, 165, 233-34, 259 and accompanying text.
291. The validity of this assumption is open to question. See supra notes 235,
256-60 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 166, 239 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
294. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4) (1962), supra note 269. Some of these
suggested mitigating circumstances appear to be particularly applicable to life-term
prisoners. See, e.g., § 210.6(4)(b) ("The murder was committed when the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."); § 210.6
(4)(c) ("The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act."); § 210.6(4)(f) ("The defendant acted under duress
or under the domination of another person."); see also Roberts H, 431 U.S. at
636-37 ("To be sure, the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing
his regular duties may be regarded as an aggravating circumstance. There is a
special interest in affording protection to these public servants who regularly must
risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and property. But it
is incorrect to suppose that no mitigating circumstance can exist when the victim
is a police officer.") (footnote omitted). The Court went on to list factors which
might mitigate this type of crime. See supra note 111. The Court's argument appears
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and expedited review of the death sentence by the New York State Court
of Appeals"' would meet with the approval of both the court of
appeals296 and the Supreme Court.297 In appropriate cases the sentenc-
ing authority would still have the option of imposing the death penalty,
but it would not be a mandatory decision which ignored any mitigating
factors unique to the defendant and the crime committed.298 In addi-
tion, because the statute would be limited to felons299 with prior
criminal records serious enough to warrant a sentence of life imprison-
ment who commit the crime of first-degree murder, it would prob-
ably be approved by the state legislature."' Obviously, even the most
constitutionally sound and carefully drafted statute will not satisfy
opponents of the death penalty.3 0' The issue as to the desirability of
the death penalty in any form ultimately will be decided outside the
legal arena. To the extent that the public supports such a penalty,302
a "guided" discretion statute appears to be the most appropriate.
Andrea Galbo
to apply equally to a life-term prisoner accused of first degree murder.
295. See supra notes 79-122, 177-79, 268-72 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 171-72, 263-67 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 79-122, 288 and accompanying text.
298. See The Death Penalty's Hardest Case, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983, at 18E,
col. 1. This editorial notes that Lemuel Smith's crimes are so horrendous that he
is an excellent choice for execution. "His brutal crimes make him Exhibit A for
capital punishment and a great burden for its opponents." Id. However, the editorial
writer still concludes that a mandatory death penalty cannot be justified even for
him. "There are degrees of uncertainty even about convicted murderers, and there
can be mistakes about murders in prison. There can also be degrees of guilt, or
insanity, in prison killers. It is simply wrong for society to deny itself, and juries,
all discretion . . . ." Id. at col. 2.
299. At the present time there is no one on death row in New York. Lemuel
Smith was the only inmate there at the time of the decision in Smith. See CAITAL.
PUNISHMENT 1983, supra note 124, at 3. Additionally, no one has been executed
in New York since 1963. See An Eye for An Eye, supra note 223, at 28.
300. People v. Smith-The Death Penalty in New York, supra note 251, at
2, col. 2. But see supra note 287.
301. See supra notes 240-60, 287 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
